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ABSTRACT 
Using quarterly data from 1992-2004, we conduct an econometric investigation 
of the short and long-run price and income elasticities of gasoline consumption 
in Turkey. We find that short-run income elasticity is 0.58, short-run price 
elasticity is -0.15 (statistically insignificant) and the long-run price elasticity is 
approximately -0.38, long-run income elasticity is approximately -0.23 
(statistically insignificant). Our findings suggest that the recent heavy taxation of 
oil derivatives in general and gasoline in particular may be optimal in Turkey. 
ÖZET 
Bu tezde 1992-2004 yılları için üç aylık veriler kullanılarak kısa ve uzun dönem 
için benzin tüketiminin fiyat ve gelir elastikiyetleri ekonometrik bir araştırma 
sonucunda ortaya konmuştur. Kısa dönem gelir elastikiyeti 0.58, kısa dönem 
fiyat elastikiyeti -0.15 (istatiksel olarak anlamsız) ve uzun dönem fiyat 
elastikiyeti -0.38, gelir elastikiyeti ise -0.23 (istatiksel olarak anlamsız) olarak 
tahmin edilmiştir. Bulgularımıza göre devletin petrol ürünleri üzerine koyduğu 
vergi optimal olabilir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Oil is an ever-larger economic input for Turkey, a country with a large 
population and rapidly increasing industrial output. In this study, we examine 
the price and income elasticities for the most significant oil derivative, namely, 
gasoline, in Turkey due to its significant share in oil consumption. We deem this 
an important research topic for various reasons. First of all, since Turkey has 
negligible oil production of its own, its oil import bill contributes significantly to 
its current account deficit. The country's current account deficit, one of the 
highest in the developing world as a percentage of GDP, in turn, is one major 
factor behind its recent economic crises which have had severe consequences for 
the country's GDP growth. Secondly, like almost all other world governments, 
the Turkish government too uses taxation at the pump to regulate the prices of 
oil derivatives. While taxation at the pump is economically desirable due to the 
negative externalities such as pollution and traffic congestion that the use of 
petroleum derivatives produces, in the Turkish case, the curbing of such 
externalities seems to have taken a backseat to raising revenue for the 
government. Indeed, in 2004, taxes collected from petroleum products made up 
nearly 20% of all budget revenues. This conjecture is further supported by the 
fact that, relative to per capita income, these taxes in Turkey were one of the 
highest in the world as of the end of 2005. Such high levels have been attained 
as a result of continuous increases in taxes as a part of the IMF program that 
Turkey has agreed to follow after the economic crisis in 2001. The period of 
high economic and political uncertainty and chaos followed by a rapid 
agreement with the IMF following the 2001 economic crisis raises the 
possibility that the Turkish government's IMF mandated policy of extremely 
high taxation of energy products in general and oil derivatives in particular may 
be a knee-jerk reaction. We also conjecture that this primary goal of raising 
budget revenues is followed closely in importance by the desire to curb the 
current account deficit, as mentioned above. 
The main objective of this study is to determine the oil demand function for 
Turkey by specifying an econometric model. With the help of this econometric 
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model, short-run and long-run income and price elasticities of gasoline 
consumption of oil demand are estimated. The final step is deciding whether 
imposing "large" tax levels on oil derivative products is optimal or not by 
evaluating these elasticity numbers in comparison with the other developing 
countries. 
The thesis is organized as follows; in section 1 we introduce our thesis and 
approach and do a literature review. In section 2, the specification of the optimal 
tax level is discussed and then the potential effects of taxation on the economy 
are introduced. In the 3 r d section, tax component of oil price in different 
countries are given and it is demonstrated that Turkey takes the first place 
between EU countries. In section 4, we briefly summarize the taxation system of 
oil products in Turkey. The next part, section 5, explains the econometric 
procedure and data to construct the consumption model of oil to estimate the 
elasticities, and the last part, section 6, is the conclusion of this thesis. 
1.1. Literature Review 
There are only a few recent research papers about the dynamics of oil demand in 
Turkey. A. Kibritcioglu (1999) constructs a VAR model by using monthly data 
for oil consumption and prices for the years between 1986 - 1998. He reaches 
the conclusion that imported crude oil prices have a small affect on inflation in 
Turkey. Another paper by Mesutoglu (2001) estimates the price elasticity of 
gasoline consumption for the years between 1990 - 1999 as -41 %. The 
explanatory variables used are population, prices of oil derivatives, prices of 
substitute goods, number of tourists visiting Turkey and seasonal dummy 
variables. A more current paper by Kirmanoglu et. al. (2003) uses monthly data 
between 1993 and 2003 to estimate income and price elasticities of oil demand. 
Their main concern, however, is air pollution that is caused by fuel 
consumption. Their findings indicate that the elasticities are very close to unit 
elasticity. Therefore, they conclude that increasing fuel taxes for more polluting 
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fuels can be an effective policy against curbing air pollution as well as raising 
revenues for the government. 
As for studies of oil demand in general, Kennedy (1974) models oil markets 
separately for the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe, the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia. In his model the exogenous variables include the regional 
supply and demand equations, the technology of refining and government policy 
variables. Similar to our thesis, his paper describes the structure of an 
econometric model of the world oil market and presents results that are used in 
forecasting and policy simulations. The results of simulations from the model 
suggest that an export duty of half of the current level, about $ 3.5 is most likely 
to occur in the long run. Kennedy also finds that the world oil price hikes which 
occurred in late 1973s are not likely to persist in the future. Ramsey, et. al, 
(1975) uses simultaneous equations model to estimate the price elasticity of 
gasoline demand in the USA. The price elasticity in this paper is equal to -0.74. 
Baltagi et. al (1983) study the gasoline demand in OECD countries. 
Wasserfallen et. al (1988) study the relationship between gasoline consumption 
and vehicle stock in Switzerland. Dahl et. al (1991) in their paper concerning 
gasoline demand have found that income and price are the most important 
variables defining gasoline demand. For a developing country, the paper of 
Garbacz (1989) can be a good reference in which gasoline demand in Taiwan is 
examined and price elasticity is found as -0.81. Ibrahim et. al (1990) attempt to 
identify the factors that have determined the level and pattern of energy demand 
in developing countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. Differently from most 
of the other elasticity estimates, Goel (1994) uses the quasi-experimental method 
which is appropriate for the commodities that have fairly stable prices and 
whose prices change as a result of tax changes for calculating the price elasticity. 
Gasoline taxation elasticity is found as -0.075 for the USA for the years 1952 -
1986 in this paper. In the research by McRae (1994), gasoline demand is 
specified for developing countries. In this study, the price elasticities for the 
middle income countries range from -0.30 to -0.32 in the short-run and -0.58 in 
the long-run. The income elasticities for the middle-income countries range from 
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0.57 to 0.67 in the short-run and 1.70 in the long-run. The price elasticities for 
the low-income countries range from -0.12 to -0.17 in the short-run and -0.31 in 
the long-run. The income elasticities for the low-income countries range from 
0.74 to 0.79 in the short-run and 1.18 in the long-run. Another recent research is 
done by Alves et. al (2003). In their paper, by using cointegration techniques, 
they estimate the price elasticity of gasoline, cross-price elasticity between 
gasoline and alcohol and the income elasticity of gasoline. Price elasticity of 
gasoline is found to be inelastic in the long-run and completely inelastic in the 
short run revealing important implications for policymakers. 
2. OPTIMAL TAX L E V E L AND E F F E C T S OF TAXATION P O L I C Y 
World energy consumption is increasing along with the population and global 
industrialization. Oil, with its large share in the total world energy consumption, 
has been a very important commodity for social and economic development of 
countries. Differently from the other energy types, oil is both an input for nearly 
all of the industries and a necessity good with no close substitutes that is 
consumed by the public. Due to its economic importance, decisions regarding 
taxation of oil products must be made with significant care. While taxation 
brings revenues for a government, it may have adverse effects to the economy. 
As the policy maker authority, one of the important subjects that a government 
must handle regarding the supply and demand for oil is managing the 
externalities that are caused by oil consumption. The most significant externality 
is air pollution. Another one is traffic congestion, especially in urban areas. 
Since currently almost all vehicles on the road need some petroleum derivative 
to run, one way of making vehicle usage costlier is by taxing oil derivative 
products to curb the resulting externalities. The most popular tool used by 
governments around the world for this purpose is taxation at the pump. Even 
though taxation is the tool of choice for governments for limiting externalities 
and increasing budget revenues, since taxes in general lead to distortions in the 
economy, determining the optimal level of taxation becomes a key issue. This 
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necessitates a good understanding of the income and price elasticities of oil 
demand and characteristics of a country. The optimal taxation theory suggests a 
hump-shaped progression of marginal taxation rate. The maximum tax receipts 
occur at the maximum point of this hump-shaped curve which gives the optimal 
tax level for the relevant industry. In Turkey's case, we conjecture that the tax 
level is on the right side of this maximum point which means the tax rate is 
higher than optimal, hence the tax receipts are below the maximum amount. 
I f the government sets taxes suboptimally, there will be two major adverse 
effects on an economy. The first one of these adverse affects is factor 
substitution. A basic production function consists of three different inputs, 
namely, labor (L), capital (K) and energy (E). When the price of oil gets higher, 
so does the cost of energy. This leads to a shift from energy to labor and capital. 
I f the increase in the price of a factor is caused by taxation, the input mix will be 
distorted and there will be efficiency loss in the economy. Hence, the inefficient 
use of oil decreases the competitive power of an economy. 
Given a fixed capital stock and limited ability to substitute away from the higher 
priced factor, the production effects of a pure cost increase are closely related to 
the share of energy in the economy. This is the GNP share of energy multiplied 
by the percent price change which gives a first-order approximation to the 
contraction in production capacity. In the short run, this change marks the 
maximum impact on the economy. As a result, both combinations of inputs 
would produce less output than the efficient combination that existed prior to the 
price change. Thus, the capacity of the economy will have decreased. 
Secondly, as a result of the high oil prices, the demand of legal oil products 
decreases and demand for illegal oil products gets a higher share in total oil 
consumption. As a result of the shift in demand, the government may not be able 
to collect projected tax revenues. Illegal oil consumption has another indirect 
effect in the economies. It is known that the illegally produced oil derivative 
products are not qualified as the legal ones as a result of their refining and 
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storage processes. These lower-quality oil derivative products may damage the 
vehicles or decrease their economic life. The consumers' choice to use the low 
quality fuel is another form of input substitution away from energy to capital. 
Today, in Turkey, there is indeed a market for the illegally produced oil. 
According to the Chamber of Commerce (Ankara Ticaret Odası, ATO), the tax 
loss due to smuggled oil in Turkey is nearly 2.5 billion dollars per year. ATO 
claims that for the years between 1996 - 2003, the increase in the number of cars 
is nearly 40%, however the increase in the oil consumption is only 11% and the 
difference between these rates is likely met by smuggled oil. As a result of this 
illegal importation and consumption, the production and consumption of oil may 
be underestimated. This underestimation may contribute to making taxation 
decisions of policymakers suboptimal. 
An indirect adverse effect of high oil price as a result of the large tax component 
is economic recession. Economic theory offers several explanations of how oil 
price increases could trigger a recession. Oil is, for practical purposes, inevitably 
used and difficult to substitute for generally in the short run. A standard 
macroeconomic analysis suggests that consumers, faced with a price run-up, 
would attempt to maintain oil consumption in the short run by reducing the 
purchases of other goods and services. The oil price increase would tend to be 
inflationary and that increase in the general price level would reduce the real 
money balances held by the public which is the stock of money adjusted for 
changes in its value caused by price-level changes. Consequently, the public 
would reduce their spending on goods and services below what would be 
required to keep their oil consumption constant to restore their real balances. 
This decrease in aggregate demand would trigger a recession in the economy. 
The government, through monetary policy actions, could increase the money 
supply to accommodate the public's reaction to real balances. The monetary 
authority's policy would depend on their evaluation of the impact of the price 
shock on subsequent levels of economic activity and on their concern with 
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inflationary pressures. An empirical study that is studied by Meyermans1, 2005, 
estimates that a permanent 25 percent oil price increase, in the long run, reduces 
aggregate private sector output by 0.27 percent in the euro area, 0.30 percent in 
the Western non-euro EU Member States, 0.33 percent in the United States, and 
0.23 percent in Japan. Price increases also affect the supply side of the economy 
by influencing the costs of producing the same volume of GDP that was 
produced prior to the shock and by changing the amount of other factors of 
production such as labor, capital, and other materials relative to oil. 
3. COMPARISON OF T H E TAX COMPONENT: T U R K E Y VS. E U 
COUNTRIES 
In most world economies, taxes are the largest component of the price of oil 
products. This is also true for Turkey, but the proportion of taxes in the total 
price in Turkey is among the highest in the world. We should note that this is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. At the beginning of 1990 the pump price of super 
gasoline in Turkey was nearly 53 cents, while at the beginning of the 2005 it was 
$1.60. However, the world price of oil in the same period increased only roughly 
100%. The gap between the world price and price in Turkey comes from the 
costs such as transportation cost, retailer margin and tax component imposed by 
Turkish government. The costs and retailer margins have behaved in predictable 
ways in this period while proportional taxes have increased substantially. At the 
beginning of 1990 the tax component was 56% of the total price, but at the 
beginning of 2005, it became nearly 73% of the total price. According to the 
research by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2000, Turkey ranked only 
12 th among 26 OECD countries2 with a 61.2% tax component. We must also 
note that the tax component of the pump price in Turkey has a significantly 
higher rank among those countries when it is measured relative to per capita 
income. The first country in 2000 was UK with 75.6%. However, according to 
1 Meyermans and Brusselen, "The Macroeconomic Effects of an Oil Price Shock on the World 
Economy" Federal Planning Bureau Economic analysis and forecasts, 2005. 
2 Relevant figure is available in the Appendix part. 
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research done by Tupras. A.S., as of January 2005 Turkey jumped to the number 
one spot in the ranking between EU countries with a 75% tax component. This 
result is illustrated in the following table. 
Table 1: E U Countries Gasoline Price Structure, January 2005 
C O U N T R Y Pump Price Tax Total Pump Tax % 
without tax (cent / liter) Price 
Belgium 41 101 142 0.71 
Denmark 39.8 101.6 141.4 0.72 
France 35.1 102.2 137.3 0.74 
Germany 38.8 108.9 147.7 0.74 
Greece 45.2 56.1 101.3 0.55 
Italy 50.2 100.7 150.9 0.67 
Netherlands 45.7 115.7 161.4 0.72 
Portugal 43.9 92.5 136.4 0.68 
Spain 43.6 70.2 113.8 0.62 
England 42 113.2 155.2 0.73 
E U Average of 25 Countries 43.8 82.2 126 0.65 
T U R K E Y 42.9 127.4 170.3 0.75 
Source: Tupraç Report, January 2005 
Furthermore, the tax component in Turkey is 10% higher than the average of the 
25 EU countries. 
On January 2005, the refinery price of super gasoline was 0.42 YTL / liter but 
the price at the pump was 2.33 YTL / liter. The pump price composition of super 
gasoline is given in Table 2 and is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Table 2: Super Gasoline Price Structure, 13 January 2005 
Super Gasoline Price Structure 13.January.2005 
YTL / liter 
Refinery Selling Price 0.42 
Private Consumption Tax 1.36 
National Stock 0.0015 
Transportation and Retailer Margin 0.19 
Value Added Tax 0.36 
Pump Price 2.33 
Source: Tupras. Report, January 2005 
Figure 1: Super Gasoline Price Structure 
Super Gasoline Price Structure, January 2005 
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The increase in pump prices in Turkey is not parallel to the increase in world oil 
prices. This is demonstrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the World Oil Price and Price at the Pump in 
Turkey 
5 
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We should also note that in Figure 2, world oil price has a smoother trend than 
the Turkey oil price. The difference is mainly due to the volatility of the tax 
component in the oil price in Turkey. 
4. TAXATION SYSTEM OF O I L CONSUMPTION IN T U R K E Y 
This section contains the basis of Turkish taxation system of oil products in 
Turkey. The Turkish oil market had been heavily regulated before significant 
liberalization that took place in 1989-1990. Until 1990 domestic oil producers 
had to sell their production to TUPRAS. Oil product prices were set by the 
government. Under Law No. 79 of 1989, importers, refineries and oil 
distribution and retailing companies were allowed to set prices freely for crude 
oil and petroleum products. However, the same law enabled the government to 
determine "fundamental principles of purchase, sale and distribution of crude oil 
and petroleum products". The outcome of this reform was that oil producers 
were allowed to sell 35% of their production freely. Oil product imports and 
exports were liberalized in 1989; all refineries and retailers with minimum 
storage capacities were granted import licenses. However, the government 
continued to prescribe annual oil import programs with the stated purpose of 
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matching refinery requirements in terms of quantity and quality. Tüpraş's ex-
refinery prices for oil products remained subject to government approval. 
Today, Turkey's main tax on oil products is the fuel consumption tax (FCT). To 
eliminate the effects of oil price fluctuations and the pronounced exchange rate 
fluctuations of the Turkish lira against the dollar on domestic oil prices, the 
government linked this tax to a mechanism called the Fuel Price Stabilization 
Fund (FPSF), as of 5 February 2000. The purpose of this fund is to stabilize 
domestic oil prices. The tax rate is inversely proportional to developments in 
international oil prices and the exchange rate of the Turkish lira against the 
dollar. 
5. E C O N O M E T R I C ANALYSIS OF O I L DEMAND IN T U R K E Y : 
ESTIMATING E L A S T I C I T I E S 
5.1. Data Description 
In order to investigate the empirical relationship among oil consumption in 
Turkey, oil prices and income levels, a log-log demand model is employed. We 
used quarterly data for the years between 1992 and 2004. We get 1990 as the 
base year for all series, however we could not use the data for years 1990-1992 
since quantity data is not available for these years. The reason to use the double¬
log functional form instead of linear form is that the estimated coefficients on 
price and income series directly give the price and income elasticities of oil 
demand. 
Oil consumption data consists of quantities of super, normal and unleaded 
gasoline consumed. For the years between 1992 and 2000 quarterly data for oil 
consumption in million tons is obtained from Petrol İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü 
(PIGM), the government oil directorate of Turkey. For the years between 2000 
and 2004, the source for the quantity series is the oil market report of Turkey 
issued by the International Energy Agency Organization. The magnitudes of the 
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consumption data for those years are consistent with the yearly consumption 
data that is published by PIGM. 
The price series is the quantity-weighted average real price of the three types of 
gasoline sold in Turkey. Inflation, current account deficit, budget deficit, and 
GDP data are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. Current account deficit 
and budget deficit data are converted to real terms and then weighted by real 
GDP. World oil price is obtained from the World Bank in dollars per barrel and 
it is converted to real YTL per liter. 
The data used in the analysis are quarterly time series from 1992:1 to 2004:4 
lnq: Natural logarithm of the total of super, normal and unleaded gasoline 
consumption 
lnp: Natural logarithm of the quantity-weighted average real price of super, 
normal and unleaded gasoline 
lnpw: Natural logarithm of World oil price, converted into real YTL per liter 
lngdp: Natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product of Turkey 
Bd: Real Budget deficit over GDP 
Ca: Real Current account over GDP 
lntax: Natural logarithm of the tax component of the gasoline price in real 
terms 
6.1.Diagnostic Tests Performed on The Data 
In this section, some preliminary tests are performed before the final 
specification. These tests are necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
chosen variables. 
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6.1.1. Test for Endogeneity 
To determine whether price is endogenous in the demand equation, we use the 
Hausman test3. The steps of the Hausman test are as follows: 
We initially estimate the equation: 
ln Qt = J30 + J31 ln Pt + J32 ln CAt + J33BDt + J34 ln GDPt + ut (1) 
This is a static model that shows the short-run elasticities. J31 is the price 
elasticity of demand while J34 is its income elasticity. However, in the next 
sections, we will estimate a dynamic model with appropriate explanatory 
variables in order to determine both short-run and long-run elasticities. The 
estimation result of the initial demand equation is given in Table 3. 
Table 3: Endogeneity test, initial specification 
Dependent Variable :lnq 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNP -0.1891 0.2469 -0.7658 0.448 
BD 0.045 0.0923 0.4875 0.628 
CA -0.0001 0.0003 -0.2144 0.831 
LNGDP 0.6381 0.2091 3.0509 0.004 
C 8.0086 1.7651 4.5372 0 
R-squared 0.2084 Schwarz criterion -0.3948 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1347 F-statistic 2.8303 
Akaike info criterion -0.5898 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0360 
In the previous regression, all the coefficients of independent variables except 
lngdp are statistically insignificant and the R-square is not sufficient enough. 
This result may be simply because of the endogeneity problem. We will try to 
3 Hausman, Jerry A. (1978) "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, 46, 1251— 
1272 
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estimate a better equation by using the instrumental variables i f endogeneity 
problem exists. 
As lnP t is thought to be endogenously determined with ln Qt, Hausman 
procedure requires regressing ln Pt on the remaining exogenous variables in the 
initial regression plus an instrumental or a set of instrumental variables (IVs) 
which are correlated with ln Pt but not with the error term of the initial 
specification. The potential IVs that are highly correlated with the original 
independent variable must be chosen to minimize the variance of the IV 
estimator as much as possible. In our demand function tax component of the 
price, lagged price and world oil price are potential IVs. Primarily, we checked 
the correlations between IVs and instrumented variable, ln Pt . Then we will 
check the correlation between IVs and the error terms of initial regression4. The 
results are given in the following tables. 
Table 4: Correlations between IVs and P t 
LNP L N T A X LNP LNPW LNP1 LNP 
LNP 1 0.93 LNP 1 0.37 LNP1 1 0.86 
L N T A X 0.93 1 LNPW 0.37 1 LNP 0.86 1 
Table 5: Correlations between IVs and Error terms 
Resid1 L N T A X Resid1 LNPW Resid1 LNP1 
Resid1 1.00 0.04 Resid1 1.00 0.00 Resid1 1.00 -0.19 
L N T A X 0.04 1.00 LNPW 0.00 1.00 LNP1 -0.19 1.00 
According to the correlation analysis, both IVs fulfill the necessary conditions, 
i.e. they are weakly correlated with the error terms of the initial specification, 
but highly correlated with the suspected variable, ln Pt. World oil price has 
4 Error terms of initial regression is denoted by "resid1". 
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lower correlation (0.37) with lnP t than the other IVs, but it is uncorrelated with 
the residuals. As a result, including both IVs in the specification seems 
meaningful. In the next step, we regress ln Pt on the remaining regressors and on 
the IVs. 
lnP t = (0 +0£At +(f>2BDt + (3 lnGDP t + j>4 lnP t - 1 +(f>5 lnPW t + (6 lnTAX t 
+ st (2) 
The result of the previous equation is given in the following table; 
Table 6: Endogeneity test, first specification 
Dependent Variable :lnp 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
BD 0.0062 0.0198 0.3155 0.7540 
CA 0.0000 0.0000 0.3981 0.6927 
LNGDP 0.0694 0.0416 1.6678 0.1032 
LNP(-1) 0.1393 0.0627 2.2203 0.0321 
LNPW 0.1739 0.0266 6.5462 0.0000 
L N T A X 0.7019 0.0522 13.4443 0.0000 
C -0.1646 0.3566 -0.4614 0.6470 
R-squared 0.9590 Schwarz criterion -3.8730 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9529 F-statistic 156.0896 
Akaike info criterion -3.8730 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
According to the probability values, all of the IVs are statistically significant 
under 95% confidence interval. The remaining independent variables are 
statistically insignificant. Next step of the Hausman Test analysis is to run a 
second regression in which we re-estimate the initial equation including the 
residuals5 from equation 2. 
ln Qt =A0 + A1 ln Pt + A2CAt + A3BDt + A4GDPt + A5st + V (3) 
5 Error terms of the second regression is denoted by "resid2". 
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Following is the output of the previous specification. 
Table 7: Endogeneity test, second specification 
Dependent Variable :LNQ 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNP -0.2144 0.2541 -0.8437 0.4037 
BD 0.0630 0.0929 0.6784 0.5014 
CA 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0667 0.9472 
LNGDP 0.5487 0.2180 2.5167 0.0159 
C 8.9733 1.8361 4.8870 0.0000 
RESID2 ( A4 ) 0.6213 0.8544 0.7272 0.4713 
R-squared 0.1772 Schwarz criterion -0.3730 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0769 F-statistic 1.7664 
Akaike info criterion -0.6092 Prob(F-statistic) 0.1413 
We will decide on whether there is an endogeneity problem in our specification 
and data by constructing the following hypothesis. 
H 0 : The OLS estimates are consistent.6 (A 4=0) 
H A : The OLS estimates are not consistent. (A 4 ^0) 
As the probability value of A4is equal to 0.4713, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. We can conclude that the OLS estimates are consistent. This result 
may not be correct since there are insignificant variables in the initial 
specification. For that reason, we will carry the endogeneity test after excluding 
insignificant CA and BD variables to be sure about the result. In our initial 
specification price is also insignificant, however as it is the main explanatory 
variable of the model, instead of omitting this variable, using appropriate lagged 
values might be a better solution. (Before the final specification, the lagged 
value(s) of the other insignificant variables will be investigated for their 
contribution to the model.) 
6 Also means there is no endogeneity problem in the initial specification. 
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6.1.2. Omitting Irrelevant Variables and Testing for Endogeneity 
In this section, we will repeat the endogeneity test again. This time we will 
exclude the BD and CA variables, because in the final specification we will 
probably not use these variables since they are insignificant and do not 
contribute to R-square. 
We will apply the same procedure like the previous section. The suspected 
variable and the instrumental variables are same. This time oil price and GDP 
are the explanatory variables. The result of the initial estimation is given in table 
8. 
ln Qt = J30 + P1 ln Pt + J32 ln GDPt + ut (4) 
Table 8: Endogeneity test, initial specification 
Dependent Variable :LNQ 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNP -0.2237 0.2194 -1.0196 0.3129 
LNGDP 0.4348 0.2066 2.1046 0.0405 
C 10.0534 1.7493 5.7469 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0836 Schwarz criterion -0.3203 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0462 F-statistic 2.2354 
Akaike info criterion -0.4328 Prob(F-statistic) 0.1177 
Then we regress ln Pt on the remaining regressors and on the IVs. 
lnP t = (0 + ( ln GDPt + (f>2 ln P t - 1 + ( 3 lnPW t + (4 ln TAXt +et (5) 
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Table 9: Endogeneity test, first specification 
Dependent Variable : LNP 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNGDP 0.0780 0.0350 2.2288 0.0308 
LNP1 0.1505 0.0555 2.7121 0.0094 
LNPW 0.1741 0.0254 6.8587 0.0000 
LNTAX 0.6848 0.0495 13.8293 0.0000 
C -0.2411 0.3077 -0.7835 0.4373 
R-squared 0.9555 Schwarz criterion -3.7617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9516 F-statistic 246.7484 
Akaike info criterion -3.9511 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
All of the IVs are again statistically significant under 95% confidence interval. 
However, the signs of the IVs are not correct, for instance we expect the quantity 
demanded to decline while there is an increase in the taxation component. Next 
step is to run a second regression in which we re-estimate the initial equation 
including the residuals7 from the equation 5. 
ln Qt = A0 + A ln Pt + A2GDPt +A3st + vt (6) 
Table 10: Endogeneity test, second specification 
Dependent Variable : LNP 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNP 0.0780 0.2228 -1.2243 0.2269 
LNGDP 0.1505 0.2117 1.7381 0.0887 
RESID3 0.1741 0.8856 0.8258 0.4131 
C 0.6848 1.8010 6.0280 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0674 Schwarz criterion -0.2970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0079 F-statistic 1.1340 
Akaike info criterion -0.4484 Prob(F-statistic) 0.3450 
7 Error terms of the second regression is denoted by "resid3". 
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By evaluating the same hypothesis, again we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the OLS estimates are consistent. As a result, there is no endogeneity 
problem after omitting the insignificant explanatory variables. 
6.1.3. Seasonal adjustment 
Economic time series based on monthly or quarterly data may exhibit seasonal 
patterns. In our case, gasoline consumption in summer may tend to increase 
because of travels to have holidays. It is often desirable to remove the seasonal 
factor to make series smoother. In this section, we will analyze i f the seasonal 
adjustment is necessary. Following figure illustrates the quantity series after and 
before the seasonal adjustment is performed. LNQSA is the seasonally adjusted 
series. 
Figure 3: Seasonal Adjustment for Quantity Series 
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We decided that seasonal adjustment did not improve the data significantly, 
so we will use seasonally unadjusted series in our model. Quantity series are 
still non-stationary and have an increasing trend. Graphs for GDP and Price 
series are included in the appendix part. 
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5.3 Specifying Final Estimation 
After evaluating different estimations due to their R-square, Schwarz and 
Akaike criterion, we decided the following auto-regressive distributed lag model 
to estimate the both short-run and long-run elasticities. 
Table 11: Final Specification 
Dependent Variable : LNQ 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 3.8755 1.9649 1.9724 0.0553 
LNQ(-1) 0.5945 0.0989 6.0092 0.0000 
LNQ(-2) 0.0594 0.1075 0.5530 0.5832 
LNQ(-3) 0.2071 0.0935 2.2137 0.0325 
LNP(-1) -0.1542 0.1243 -1.2402 0.2219 
LNGDP 0.5841 0.1100 5.3106 0.0000 
LNGDP(-I) -0.7404 0.1263 -5.8606 0.0000 
R-squared 0.7733 Schwarz criterion -1.5324 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7401 F-statistic 23.314 
Akaike info criterion -1.8052 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
lnQ t = 3,8755 - 0,1542lnP-1 + 0,5945lnQ_x + 0,0594lnQ - 2 
+ 0,2071ln Q - 3 + 0,5841ln GDP - 0,7404lnGDP_X (7) 
In this final estimation, R-squared, 0.78, is quite good for our purposes. 
5.4 Residual Test Result of the Final Specification 
We performed the residual tests of the final specification in this section. White 
Heteroskedasticity test8 is employed to investigate whether the residuals of the 
regression have constant variance. F-statistics of the test is 0.813 and probability 
value is 0.637. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of there is no 
heteroskedasticity in 5% significance level. When we plot the residuals about the 
8 Complete White Heteroskedasticity test result is available in the appendix. 
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zero line, we can see that residuals are stable in parameters of the equation 
except 1999. 
Figure 4: Plot of Recursive Residuals 
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We use Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation L M Test9 and the F-statistics of the 
test is 0.1049 and probability value is 0.90. Again, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis which means there is no serial correlation between the residuals. 
5.5 Estimating Short-run and Long-run Elasticities 
The coefficients of ln P - 1 and ln GDP show us the short-run elasticities. Short-
run price elasticity is equal to -0.15 and short-run income elasticity is 0.58. 
However, short-run price elasticity is not statistically significant (p-value = 
0.2219). We did not include ln P in our estimation since it did not contribute to 
R-square and was insignificant. In our analysis, quantity variable consists of the 
total of three months, so considering the coefficient of ln P - 1 (instead of ln P ) 
as the short-run price elasticity makes sense. 
9 Complete Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation L M test result is available in the appendix. 
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The long-run effect in an autoregressive distributed lag model is ^^_Qat where 
at is the lagged terms' coefficient. The formulation of the lagged terms' 
coefficients are as the following; 
1: at0 = ft> fwhlch will always be the case), 
V: = ft o r « , = fa +a0r\, 
L-: = fa or a2 = + a0yz + « m , 
L 3 : —»oHa - - a z ^ + «s = & Or ffg = & 4- QqH + « 1 ft 4- GfcM, 
L4: — « 1 ^ 3 - - «aW + a* = 0 o r « 4 = y^ctg + ytcti + , 
V: —atj-sys - « J - .zyz — ctj--\y\ -\- ctj = 0 o r ay = Kitty _i + > ï « y - 2 + H3«y-s. / = 5.6, 
In our case J3t s are the coefficients of lag values of price, but only J31 is 
available which is equal to -0.15419. yt s are the coefficients of lag values of 
quantity and y1 = 0.5945 y2 = 0.0594 Y 3 = 0.2071. In the following table, the 
contribution of the each lag to the long-run equilibrium is given. 
Table 12: Lag-coefficients of Long-run Price elasticity 
Lagged term 1 2 3 4 5 
Lag Coefficients -0.15 -0.09 -0.054 -0.047 -0.030 
The long-run price elasticity of oil demand is equal to approximately -0.38. 15% 
of the long-run effect is coming from the first lagged term. This price elasticity 
is a plausible number for a developing country and consistent with the previous 
researches. The standard error of the long-run effect10 is equal to 0.18 and 
calculated t-statistics is equal to -2.23, so the long-run effect is significant at 5% 
significance level. 
We will imply the same procedure to calculate the income elasticity of oil 
demand; this time J3t s are the coefficients of lag values of GDP. 
1 0 The standard error of the long-run effect is the sum of the standard errors of the coefficients of 
the lagged terms of the independent variable divided by one minus the sum of the standard errors 
of the coefficients of lagged terms of the dependent variable. 
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Table 13: Lag-coefficients of Long-run Income elasticity 
Lagged term 0 1 2 3 4 5_ 
Lag Coefficients | 0.584 | -0.3931 -0.1991 -0.130 | -0.095 | -0.05 
Long-term income elasticity is approximately -0.223. It is not a plausible 
number, because we expect a positive income elasticity. The standard error of 
the long-run income effect is equal to 0.17 and calculated t-statistics is equal to -
1.31. It is not statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This thesis aims to reveal the magnitudes of both short-run and long-run income 
and price elasticities of gasoline consumption in Turkey. We are interested in 
this subject, because, as of the end of 2005, Turkey had the highest tax 
component in domestic oil prices among all European countries. 
According to our findings, we estimate the short-run price elasticity as -
0.15, but this is not statistically significant. Short-run income elasticity is 0.58 
and is statistically significant. It has a positive sign as expected. Our estimate of 
the long-run price elasticity is approximately -0.38 and we find the long-run 
income elasticity as approximately -0.223. Long-run price elasticity is 
statistically significant while long-run income elasticity is not. 
Due to the income elasticity of oil demand, in the short-run, 1% increase in the 
real income level of public increases the oil consumption on average by 0.58%. 
However, it is not correct to use short-run income elasticity in policy-making. 
By increasing the price of the oil derivative products 1%, government will lead 
to a reduction of approximately 0.38% of the quantity demanded. In that sense, 
oil tax level in Turkey seems not to be overly high. One reason of this relative 
inelasticity may be that since Turkey is a developing country that requires oil as 
a major input to generate its output, oil for the most part is consumed out of need 
and is therefore not a discretionary spending item. Moreover, oil has no close 
substitutes so whatever the price of the oil derivative products, in most of the 
industries, consumption remains nearly the same. This result is independent 
from the country-based elasticity but generally valid for developing countries. 
Another reason may be Turkey's geographic location. As it is the transportation 
center between Asia and Europe, foreign vehicles may be contributing 
significantly to oil consumption. However, we do not have data regarding this 
point. 
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Similar studies that are carried for other developing countries such as South 
Korea, Philippines and Taiwan indicate similar price elasticity numbers that 
varies between -0.30 and -0.60. However, in those countries, the tax component 
of oil price is smaller than it is in Turkey. 
As a result, we advocate that price elasticity of oil demand for Turkey is as it is 
anticipated. According to the magnitude of this elasticity, tax component of oil 
price seems not suboptimal. However, the answer of this phenomenon will also 
depend on the magnitude of the distortions in the Turkish economy that oil 
taxation causes, but this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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OECD Countries' Gasoline Price and Tax Component, 2000 
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Seasonal Adjustment for Price Series 
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White Heteroskedasticity Test Output 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.812409 Probability 0.636339 
Obs*R-squared 10.45719 Probability 0.575918 
Dependent Variable: RESIDA2 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1992:4 2004:3 
Included observations: 48 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -33.03283 19.87428 -1.662089 0.1054 
LNQ(-1) 1.885835 1.331861 1.415940 0.1656 
LNQ(-1)A2 -0.069520 0.048789 -1.424925 0.1630 
LNQ(-2) 0.531027 1.220474 0.435098 0.6662 
LNQ(-2)A2 -0.018604 0.044747 -0.415757 0.6801 
LNQ(-3) 1.575094 1.177386 1.337789 0.1896 
LNQ(-3)A2 -0.057837 0.043136 -1.340807 0.1886 
LNP(-1) 0.409830 0.428303 0.956871 0.3452 
LNP(-1)A2 -0.071799 0.073540 -0.976331 0.3356 
LNGDP 1.070431 1.251197 0.855526 0.3981 
LNGDPA2 -0.054458 0.063478 -0.857899 0.3968 
LNGDP(-1) -0.037718 1.397074 -0.026998 0.9786 
LNGDP(-1)A2 0.002889 0.070947 0.040719 0.9678 
R-squared 0.217858 Mean dependent var 0.007192 
Adjusted R-squared -0.050305 S.D.dependent var 0.010473 
S.E. of regression 0.010733 Akaike info criterion -6.005084 
Sum squared resid 0.004032 Schwarz criterion -5.498300 
Log likelihood 157.1220 F-statistic 0.812409 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.097518 Prob(F-statistic) 0.636339 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation L M Test Output 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 0.104965 Probability 0.900609 
Obs*R-squared 0.256993 Probability 0.879417 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -0.045606 2.033692 -0.022425 0.9822 
LNQ(-1) -0.039948 0.138482 -0.288470 0.7745 
LNQ(-2) 0.020475 0.135339 0.151290 0.8805 
LNQ(-3) 0.006632 0.109656 0.060479 0.9521 
LNP(-1) -0.021295 0.146261 -0.145598 0.8850 
LNGDP 0.008565 0.114165 0.075020 0.9406 
LNGDP(-1) 0.020260 0.149896 0.135161 0.8932 
RESID(-1) 0.097134 0.214442 0.452959 0.6531 
RESID(-2) -0.000621 0.227649 -0.002726 0.9978 
R-squared 0.005354 Mean dependent var 1.51E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.198676 S.D. dependent var 0.085701 
S.E. of regression 0.093829 Akaike info criterion -1.727318 
Sum squared resid 0.343354 Schwarz criterion -1.376468 
Log likelihood 50.45564 F-statistic 0.026241 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.012464 Prob(F-statistic) 0.999994 
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